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Abstract
In this paper I analyse a probabilistic voting model where self-interested
governments set their taxation policies in order to maximise the probabil-
ity of winning elections. Society is divided into groups which have di¤erent
preferences for the consumption of goods. Results show how candidates
are captured by the most powerful groups, which not necessarily repre-
sent the median voter but may be located at more extreme positions. The
introduction of a probabilistic voting model characterized by the presence
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of single-minded groups overrules the classic results achieved by the me-
dian voter theorem, because it is no longer the position on the income
scale to drive the equilibrium policy but the ability of groups to focus on
their most preferred goods, instead. This ability allows them to achieve
a strong political power which candidates cannot help going along with,
because they would lose elections otherwise.
JEL Classication : D11, H24, H53
Keywords : Probabilistic Voting Theory, Single-mindedness, Indirect
Taxation, Public Expenditure
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1 Introduction
Taxation has been a much-discussed topic in the economic literature. From
previous contributions we know that the maximum e¢ ciency is achieved via
lump-sum taxes, because they nullify the excess burden of taxation. Neverthe-
less, such a taxation is not desirable because considered unjust. Thus, in order
to achieve equity goals, benevolent governments must accept that taxpayers
distort their economic choices in order to escape the burden of taxation. As a
consequence market failures, such as a reduction in the labour supply, arise.
In democratic societies, allocation choices for the public sector are made
through voting, and through the actions of elected representatives. Economic
outcomes must be evaluated in such a broader context, one that allows for
the possibility of setting tax rates at candidate discretion, together with the
collective nature of existing political institutions that must be relied on to take
decisions on scal issues.
Depending on whether the political decision-making mechanism is considered
by the analysis or not, the literature on taxation has divided in two main streams
of research: the normative and the positive approach.
The normative approach seeks e¢ ciency-oriented solutions considering the
existence of a benevolent social-planner who avoids any concern regarding the
collective action. A tenet achieved by this analysis states that a tax system
is e¢ cient if it minimizes the total excess burden of raising a given amount of
revenues. A typical application of this approach is the inverse elasticity rule
associated with Ramsey (1927) who analysed an economy with sales taxes im-
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posed on di¤erent commodities. This work concludes a¢ rming that, in order to
minimise the excess burden, higher tax rates should be levied on commodities
which have a relatively inelastic demand in the range of the demand function
with respect to commodities whose demands are more elastic, so as to raise a
given total revenue while avoiding, as far as possible, the excess burdens asso-
ciated with the substitution away from commodities whose after-tax price has
risen. Furthermore, a version of Ramseys rule modied by Diamond (1975)
envisions a planner who takes distributional goals into account, derived from a
welfare function where weights are attached to the welfare of di¤erent individ-
uals. In order to maximise social welfare the planner equalizes distributionally
weighted marginal excess burdens per dollar raised across available tax bases.
Otherwise, the positive approach studies collective choice processes and their
inuence on political and economic outcomes. Works which belong to this sec-
ond strand do not only focus on market failures but also on political failures.
Two recent works (Polo, 1998; Svensson, 1997) focalise on the role of political
competition where candidates propose policy platforms in order to maximise
the probability of winning elections (or the number of votes), under uncertainty
about voters political preferences. Since individuals aim to maximise their
utility inuenced by public policies, they react positively to an increase in the
amount of public goods and negatively to the payment of taxes and to welfare
losses caused by taxation. The maximisation of the probability of winning is
achievable if politicians design an equilibrium tax structure which equalises the
change in opposition per marginal tax dollar raised across groups.
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It is essential to understand equilibrium outcomes produced by well-functioning
political processes, and to examine how such outcomes change when imperfec-
tions become part of the collective action. This implies that we need a model
of collective choice as our starting point that allows to study and demonstrate
the existence and stability of political equilibria and to examine the nature of
specic equilibrium policies or outcomes. Probabilistic voting Theory is able
to accomplish this goal, since the resulting Nash equilibria amongst parties are
Pareto-optimal. (Hettich and Winer 1999, Chapter 4.) However, the need of
taking this basic analytical step is not tied to the use of a particular framework;
rather, it arises from the fundamental nature of normative analysis itself. Im-
perfections in private markets have their counterparts in failures of the political
process. As a consequence, we must focus on the operation of the collective
decision mechanism in order to identify those features that cause it to operate
imperfectly. Not only must we begin by modelling a political process that leads
to an optimal allocation of resources, but it is also necessary to determine tai-
lored tax policies that will be part of the political equilibrium. Once this has
been accomplished, we can then extend the examination to specic imperfec-
tions of collective decision-making and trace out their implications for structure
of tax policies. Few authors writing on taxation have concerned themselves
with this research programme but unless it is carried out, economists cannot
accomplish an analysis of tax policy failures that has the same force as does the
well-known work on private market imperfections.
Finally, once we introduce also equity goals in the analysis we must deal
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with welfare state programmes which transfer resources amongst groups. A
question naturally arises: to what extent do voterspreferences inuence these
programmes? A standard model of redistributive taxation may be found in
Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981); if we suppose
that individual productivity di¤ers and so does the availability of leisure, it can
be demonstrated that political candidates commit to the policy preferred by
the median voter. In equilibrium, taxes are higher the greater is the distance
between median and mean income, a specic measure of income inequality.
Nevertheless, in these models the single-peakedness condition, which is necessary
for an equilibrium to exist, is very likely to fail, as the authors demonstrated.
In this paper I will analyse how self-interested governments set their taxation
policies in a probabilistic voting model. Candidates are pure voter-seekers and
aim to maximise the probability of winning elections. Society is divided into
groups who assign di¤erent weights to consumption of goods, based on their
preferences; that is they have di¤erent levels of single-mindedness. Results show
how in equilibrium candidates must satisfy the most powerful groups, which not
necessarily represent the median voter, or the middle class, but may be located
at extreme positions on the income scale. The introduction of a probabilistic
voting model characterized by single-minded groups breaks the classic result of
median voter models because it is no longer the position on the income scale
which drives the choice of candidates but the ability of groups to focus on issues
they prefer, instead. This ability enables them to achieve a strong political power
which candidates cannot help going along with, because they would lose the
6
elections, otherwise. Escaping the more single-minded groups is impossible to
politicians, as long as they are prisoner of their own self-interest. In this vicious
circle, the role of taxation reduces only to protect private interests. Results of
this model represent the antithesis of classic normative models. Taxation loses
its pro-active role as a mechanism to redistribute resources from the rich to the
poor or to supply public goods and becomes only a key to win elections, no
matter if this means protecting even the richest components of society.
Results of this model would provide also a possible answer for the existence
of the indirect taxation. This is an old issue addressed by Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) who demonstrated that the optimal direct-cum-indirect tax problem puts
all commodity taxes to zero and raises everything through income tax. More
recent works by Laroque (2005) and Kaplow (2006) demonstrated that Atkinson
and Stiglitzs result is even stronger because there appears to be no role for
taxes on commodities even in the presence of a not optimally designed tax
structure. Then, why Governments are so reluctant to abolish indirect taxation?
If we consider that direct taxation is progressive in practice whilst indirect
taxation is mildly regressive1 it might be perfectly possible to see the interest
of powerful interest groups to prevent a substantial shift from indirect to direct
taxation. If more single-minded groups nd amongst the richest component of
society and are not favourable to increase the weight of direct taxation with
respect to indirect taxation, Governments could not undertake this reform. As
a consequence income distribution is less egalitarian.
1 see Jones (2007) and Keen (2007)
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The paper is organised as follows: section two introduces a model of indi-
rect taxation, section three extend the model allowing for endogenous public
expenditure and section four concludes.
2 A model of indirect taxation
8
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I consider a society divided into H groups, indexed by h = 1; :::;H. Groups
have size fh and their members are exactly alike. Two political candidates,
j = D;R, run for an election. Both candidates have an ideological label (for
example, Democrats and Republicans), exogenously given. Voterswelfare de-
pends on two components: the rst is deterministic and it is represented by the
consumption of goods, whilst the second is stochastic and derives from personal
attributes of candidates.
Each individual in group h derives his consumption from n goods xhi , indexed
by i = 1; :::; n. Consumption is a function of the tax policy chosen by candidates
and it is perfectly observable. The deterministic component of welfare may be
written in a logarithmic fashion,
nP
i=1
 hi log x
h
i , where  
h
i represents the weight
that group h attaches to good i.
The stochastic component is denoted by DR 

h + &

, where the indicator
function
DR =
8>><>>:
1 if R wins
0 if D wins
The random variable & Q 0 reects candidate Rs popularity amongst voters
and it is realized between the announcement of policies and elections. It is not
idiosyncratic and it is uniformly distributed as
&  U

 1
2
;
1
2

with mean zero. Otherwise, h Q 0 represents an idiosyncratic random variable
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which measures voters preferences for D. It is not perfectly observable by
candidates and it is uniformly distributed as
h  U

  1
2sh
;
1
2sh

again with mean zero and density sh.
Therefore, a representative individual in group h maximizes the following
utility function:
Uh =
nX
i=1
 hi log x
h
i +D
R 

h + &

(1)
under the following budget constraint
nX
i=1
qji x
h
i =M
h (2)
whereMh is the income of any individual in group h. I denote by qji = pi+t
j
i the
consumption price of good i, by pi the xed production price2 and by t
j
i the unit
excise tax levied by candidate j on good i. Hence,  !x = [x1; :::; xn] 2 X  Rn
denotes the vector of the consumption of goods,
 !
qj =
h
qj1; :::; q
j
n
i
2 Qj  Rn
the vector of consumption prices,  !p = [p1; :::; pn] 2 P  Rn the vector of
production prices and
 !
tj =
h
tj1; :::; t
j
n
i
2 T j  Rn the vector of tax rates.
I introduce two important denitions:
Denition 1 group A is said to be more single-minded than group B with re-
2 In this model I do not take into account the impact of taxation on production.
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spect to good i if the weight assigned by A to i is greater than the weight assigned
by B. That is, if  Ai >  
B
i .
This denition states that groups, in attributing di¤erent weights to the
consumption of goods, are less or more likely to substitute a good with another3
depending on preferences they have for every good. As a consequence, there
exist some goods whose consumption is more defended by groups, because its
reduction would a¤ect individualswelfare in a more tangible way.
Denition 2 group A is said to be more politically powerful than group B if its
density is higher than Bs. That is if sA > sB.
In this case the political power of a group must be intended as the ability of
inuencing candidateschoices, when they have to take decisions over a policy.
In traditional probabilistic voting models this power is expressed by a density
function which captures the distribution of the electorate.
2.1 The demand for goods
Individuals maximize 1 subject to 2. For any group the Lagrangian function is
Lh =
nX
i=1
 hi log x
h
i +D
R 

h + &

+ h
 
Mh  
nX
i=1
qji x
h
i
!
The set of rst order conditions is
3For a complete discussion on the Single Mindedness Theory see Canegrati (2006) and
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999)
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0BBBBBBBBBB@
@L1
@x11
: : : @L
H
@xH1
...
. . .
@L1
@x1n
@LH
@xHn
@L1
@1
@LH
@H
1CCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBB@
 11
x11
= 1qj1 : : :
 H1
xH1
= Hqj1
...
. . .
...
 1n
x1n
= 1qjn
 Hn
xHn
= Hqjn
nP
i=1
qji x
1
i =M
1
nP
i=1
qji x
H
i =M
H
1CCCCCCCCCCA
The resolution of rst order conditions yields Marshallian demand functions
xhi =
 hiM
h
qji
and the indirect utility functions
V

x

qji ;M
h

=
nX
i=1
 hi log
 hiM
h
qji
+DR 

h + &

2.2 Political Competition
I consider now the problem of candidates. What distinguishes this contribution
from previous taxation models in Political Economy is the existence of a new
setting where probabilistic voting and single-mindedness theory fuse together.
In the classic theory of optimal taxation governments had always been consid-
ered as benevolent planners, who aimed to maximise a social welfare function
whose characteristics depended on preferences for equity. Hence, preferences of
society were perfectly mirrored by policy-makers preferences. Weights attached
to the utility of di¤erent agents were higher for the poorest and lower for the
richest.
In this model politicians are considered as voter-seekers who aim to maximise
the probability of winning elections by choosing an optimal policy vector
 !
tj .
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Each voter in group h votes for R if and only if Rs policy provides him with a
greater utility than that provided by D. That is, a generic voter  votes for D
if and only if:
V h
 !
tR

+ ;h + &  V h
 !
tD

8 (3)
where V h
 !
tj

represents the indirect utility function which individuals in group
h derive under the vector of policies chosen by candidate j. Within each group
there is a fraction of swing voters, denoted byb, represented by those individuals
who do not have a particular preference for D or R. For these voters equation
3 holds with equality:
b;h = V h
 !
tD

  V h
 !
tR

  & (4)
Otherwise, voter  votes for D if ;h < b;h and for R if ;h > b;h. Swing
voters are pivotal, since even a small change in the policy vector makes them
no longer indi¤erent to candidates and then they vote for one of two.
The probability of winning elections for candidate j is written as4
pj
 !
tj ;
 !
t j

=
1
2
+
d
s
HX
h=1
fhsh
h
V
 !
tj

  V
 !
t j
i
(5)
4For a complete derivation of the probability of winning in a probabilitic voting model, see
Canegrati (2006) or Persson and Tabellini (2000).
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where V
 !
tj

:= V

pi + t
j
i ;M
h

and s :=
P
h
shfh.
Axiom 3 the density function of a group is twice di¤erentiable and monoton-
ically increasing in the consumption of goods. That is sh = s(xh1 ; :::; x
h
n), with
@sh
@xhi
> 0.
This axiom brings something new with respect to traditional probabilistic
voting models, where the density function was always treated as a constant. This
idea to make the density function depend on consumption of goods is new and
deserve to be explained. The classic literature on probabilistic voting models
(Persson and Tabellini (2000), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Coughlin (1992))
has always assumed that political preferences of voters for candidates have a
distribution where the density function is a constant. Instead, in this model,
the density function is increasing in the level of consumption which in turn is
a¤ected by the vector of policies. Candidates realize that, should they change
their policy vector, the density function of groups, and thus their political power,
would change. Hence, I suggest the existence of a nexus amongst governments
choices, voters consumption and political power of groups which eventually
a¤ects electionsoutcome.
Furthermore, as suggested by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), I assume that
Remark 4 there exists a balanced-budget constraint
X
h
fh
X
i
tjix

qji ;M
h

= 0 (6)
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which coerces the government to redistribute, via transfers, all the tax revenues
collected.
This assumption allows us to treat the model as purely redistributive,
with the advantage of clearly showing the redistribution e¤ects, neglecting any
concern about the existence of public expenditure. In turn, equation 6 states
that all the revenues collected via taxation are used to redistribute wealth
amongst groups. As a consequence, if some groups are better o¤ by the achieve-
ment of a net transfer, some others must necessarily be worse o¤, because they
have to bear the payment of these transfers.
Finally, notice how this political game is a two-person, constant-sum and
symmetric game where a pair of policies is an equilibrium pair if and only if
it is a saddle point for
  =
 
TD; TR; pD; 1  pD
2.3 The equilibrium
To solve the problem I write the Lagrangian function for D (the same holds for
R):
LD = 1
2
+
d
s
X
h
fhsh

V
 !
tD

  V
 !
tR

+D
 X
h
fh
X
i
tDi x
 
qDi ;M
h
!
(7)
The set of rst order conditions is:
17
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
@LD
@qD1
= @
@qD1
 
1
s

d
P
h
fhsh
h
V
 !
tD

  V
 !
tR
i
+ ds
P
h
fh @s
h
@qD1
h
V
 !
tD

  V
 !
tR
i
+
+ds
P
h
@V h
@qD1
fhsh + D
P
o
tDo
P
h
fh
@xho
@qDo
+ xho

= 0 o 6= i
...
@LD
@qDn
= @
@qDn
 
1
s

d
P
h
fhsh
h
V
 !
tD

  V
 !
tR
i
+ ds
P
h
fh @s
h
@qDn
h
V
 !
tD

  V
 !
tR
i
+
+ds
P
h
@V h
@qDn
fhsh + D
P
o
tDo
P
h
fh
@xho
@qDo
+ xho

= 0
@LD
@D
=
X
h
fh
P
i
tDi x
 
qDi ;M
h

= 0
In this game, the existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed by the concavity
of the utility functions. This proof which exploits the concavity assumptions
was adopted in a voting model by Hinich et al. (1973). An easy proof is also
provided by Coughlin (1985), for special cases of redistributive models.
Proposition 5 In a constant-sum game an equilibrium is achieved via a con-
vergence of policy; that is:
 !
tD =
 !
tR.
Proof. First of all, we have dened   as a constant-sum game, since pR
 !
tD;
 !
tR

=
1 pD
 !
tD;
 !
tR

. Suppose now that the pair
 !
tD;
 !
tR

2 TT is an equilibrium
of the game. Suppose also that
 !
tD 6=  !tR. We know from 5 that pD
 !
tR;
 !
tR

=
1
2 , because V
 !
tR

= V
 !
tR

and thus ds
HP
h=1
fhsh
h
V
 !
tj

  V
 !
t j
i
= 0.
Therefore, by the denition of a Nash Equilibrium it must be
pD
 !
tD;
 !
tR

> pD
 !
tR;
 !
tR

=
1
2
(8)
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By the denition of a constant-sum game we also know that pR
 !
tD;
 !
tD

=
1  pD
 !
tD;
 !
tD

= 12 and again by the denition of a Nash Equilibrium, it must
be
pR
 !
tR;
 !
tD

> pR
 !
tD;
 !
tD

=
1
2
(9)
Since pR
 !
tR;
 !
tD

= 1   pD
 !
tR;
 !
tD

, this implies that pD
 !
tR;
 !
tD

< 12 .
By 8, this implies that pD
 !
tR;
 !
tD

> 12 , a contradiction. Therefore,
 !
tD =
 !
tR.
Corollary 6 In equilibrium, V
 !
tD

= V
 !
tR

.
Proof. By the meaning of Proposition 5,
 !
tD =
 !
tR. Therefore, V
 !
tD

=
V
 !
tR

.
Exploiting Corollary 6, we may re-write the rst order conditions in the
following manner:
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
@LD
@qD1
= ds
P
h
@V h
@qD1
fhsh + D
P
o
tDo
P
h
fh
@xho
@qDo
+ xho

= 0 o 6= i
...
@LD
@qDn
= ds
P
h
@V h
@qDn
fhsh + D
P
o
tDo
P
h
fh
@xho
@qDo
+ xho

= 0
@LD
@D
=
X
h
fh
P
i
tDi x
 
qDi ;M
h

= 0
From Roys Identity we know that @V
h
@qDi
=  hxhi where h is the marginal
utility of income. Applying Slutzky decomposition we obtain the Slutzky matrix
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Dqjx
 
qj ;Mh

= Dqjh
 
qj ; Uh
 DMhx  qj ;Mhx  qj ;Mh>
An element of the matrix is @x
h
i
@qDi
=
@(xhi )
c
@qDi
  @xhi
@Mh
xhi , where
@(xhi )
c
@qDi
is the change
in the Hicksian demand with a change in price, representing the substitution
e¤ect, and @x
h
i
@Mh
xhi is the income e¤ect. Under the hypothesis of normal goods
@xhi
@qDi
< 0, for every i. Substituting these two expressions in the set of rst order
conditions we obtain:
@LD
@qDi
=  
X
h
 
hfhsh
d
s
+ Dfh
X
o
tDo
@xho
@Mh
!
xhi +
D
 X
o
tDo
X
h
fhhoi + x
h
o
!
= 0
(10)
Expression
h;D := hfhsh
d
s
+ Dfh
X
o
tDo
@xho
@Mh
denotes the marginal probability of winning of D for group h. It measures
the weight that D attaches to group h as a function of its political power,
represented by two parameters: density and size. A suitable interpretation for
this expression is the following: redistribution transfers are a function of the
weight that candidates attribute to groups, which depends on the e¤ect that a
change in the utility of the group, due to a change in the policy vector, has on the
probability of winning at the margin. Hence, groups are assigned with a weight
which is higher the more single-minded the group. Furthermore, hoi :=
@(xhi )
c
@qDo
20
represents the e¤ect of a variation in price of good o on the compensated demand
of good i for group h. Equation 10 may be re-written as follows:
@LD
@qDi
=  
X
h
hxhi + 
D
 X
o
tDo
X
h
fhhoi + x
h
o
!
= 0 (11)
Dividing both sides by D and xhi and re-arrange terms we nally obtain:
 
P
o
tDo
P
h
fhhoi
xhi
=  x
ch
i
xhi
=
D   hi
D
(12)
8i
h;Di :=
P
h
hxhi
xhi
represents what in the literature is known as the ditributive
characteristic of good i for group h and for candidate D.  xchi
xhi
represents
approximately the proportional variation in the compensated aggregate demand
of good i.
Proposition 7 The distributive characteristic is higher the higher is the amount
of good consumed by groups which receive a higher weight by candidates, that is
the more single-minded.
Proof. the distributive characteristic of good i for group h and for candidate
D is obtained by multiplying the marginal probability of winning of candidate
j for group h by consumption of a good by group h with respect to the total
consumption of good i. Notice that h;Di is increasing in 
h;D, being @
h;D
i
@h;D
= 1.
We also know that h;D increases with respect to an increase in the groups
21
density,
@h
@sh
= hfh
d
s
0BBB@1 
<1z }| {
fhsh
s
1CCCA > 0
By Axiom 3 we know that the density function is monotonically increasing in
the consumption of goods. Finally, the rst order derivative of the Marshallian
functions is increasing in the level of single-mindedness, since @x
h
i
@ hi
= M
h
qji
> 0.
Therefore, more single-minded groups provide the candidates with a higher
marginal probability of winning, which translates the consumption of goods in
higher level of distributive characteristics. We have found a precise linkage
between single-mindedness and distributive characteristic summarised by the
following scheme:
single mindedness (") =) consumption of good (") =)
density function (") =) distributive characteristic (")
Proposition 8 The optimal tax structure induces a lower reduction in the con-
sumption of those goods which are the most preferred by more single-minded
groups.
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Proof. a reduction in consumption is captured by the left-hand side of 12, which
is negative. This expression is lower the lower is the right-hand side, which is
lower the smaller the di¤erence between j and h;j . By proposition 7 we know
that the distributive characteristic is higher the higher the single-mindedness of
a group and hence the right-hand side reduces as well.
To what extent do taxation of goods obtained in this political economy
framework di¤er from the classic taxation à la Ramsey? To answer, we must
compare the many-person Ramseys rule (Diamond, 1975) with equation 12. In
the former, optimal tax rates induce a lower reduction in the consumption of
those goods which are more consumed by the poor, because this category of
individuals are assigned with a higher weight by society. Instead, in 12, the
weight attached by candidates does not only depend on individualsincome but
also on groups political power. That is, the more powerful groups obtain a
higher political consideration by candidates. As a consequence, candidates do
not only take equity goals into account, as in the classic Ramsey rule. This atti-
tude represents the real political failure of this model compared to a traditional
model taken from the optimal theory of taxation. The di¤erence between the
traditional Ramsey rule  
P
o
to
P
h
hoi
xhi
=
 hi
 and 12 can be calculated taking the
di¤erence of the two expressions. This di¤erence, equal to
h

@W
@V h
  fhsh d
s

+ j
 
1  fhX
o
tjo
@xho
@Mh
is higher the lower fh and sh; this means that the less single-minded groups
receive a lower weight by candidates, whilst under Ramsey the social weight
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assigned by the Government depends on the e¤ect which an increase in the
utility of group h has on the social welfare at the margin, @W
@V h
. This weight
is generally higher for the poorest as long as the Social Welfare Function is
strictly concave. I remark that 12 does not say that candidates totally neglect
the welfare of the poor because h;j is higher the higher is the marginal utility of
income, h, which is higher for the poorest5 . Notice also that the classic Ramsey
rule and 12 coincide if @W
@V h
= fhsh ds ; that is, if the importance attributed by
society to the increase in the welfare of group h is exactly equal to the political
importance attributed by candidates to the same group. In this case, and only in
this case, the normative and the positive approaches achieve the same results.
Nevertheless, a tenet taken by the theory of optimal taxation still holds: in
equilibrium, the policy chosen by candidates is characterised by di¤erent tax
rates, even though the redistribution does not take place between the rich and
the poor but between the strongest and the weakest groups. The following table
compares results obtained under the classic Ramsey rule and 12.
5The marginal utility of income is always decreasing in the level of income.
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3 Endogenous public expenditure
I analyse now an extension of the previous model considering a Government
which must choose both the tax rates and the provision of a public good. The
introduction of public goods in probabilistic voting models with single-minded
groups raises two fundamental questions:
1. to what extent is the optimal provision of public goods inuenced by
distortionary taxation?
2. to what extent is the traditional Samuelson rule modied when the Gov-
ernment is not benevolent but aims to maximise the probability of winning
elections?
The problem of the individual may be re-written in the following log-linear
fashion:
max
fxhi g
nX
i=1
 hi log(x
h
i ) + '
h logGj +DR 

h + &

s:t:
nX
i=1
qji x
h
i =M
h
where Gj denotes the per-capita level of provision of a public good chosen
by candidates and 'h the idiosyncratic preference of group h for the provision of
the public good, or in other words, the mindedness of the group for the amount
of the public good. The production of this good is entirely nanced by taxes
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levied on tax-payers. Thus, individualschoices are inuenced by the amount
of the public good. On the one hand, G reduces the individuals disposable
income, since the higher G the higher the taxes which individuals must pay to
balance their budget; in turn, public expenditure crowds out private consump-
tion. On the other hand, the arising substitution e¤ect depends on the degree
of complementarity or substitutability between private and public goods; the
e¤ect of a change in the amount of public good on private goods is higher the
higher is the degree of complementarity between private and public goods.
Solving the individual maximization problem we obtain the Marshallian
functions xhi =
 hiM
h
qji
and the Indirect Utility Function
U
 
xhi ; G
j

= V

x

qji ;M
h

; Gj

The Governments budget constraint is:
C
 
Gj
X
h
fh =
X
h
fh
X
i
tjix

qji ;M
h

where C
 
Gj

denotes the per-capita cost function of the public good. I assume
that C
 
Gj

is a twice di¤erentiable function, with CGj :=
@C(Gj)
@Gj > 0 and
CGjGj :=
@2C(Gj)
@2Gj > 0; that is, the production of the public good has marginal
decreasing costs. Furthermore, CGj measures the Marginal Rate of Transfor-
mation (MRT) and in order to emphasise this fact I will dene CGj :=MRT j .
Secondly, I solve the candidates problem, which is the same as before, mod-
ied only by the presence of the public good. I denote the new candidate policy
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vector by j =
h
tj1; :::; t
j
n; G
j
i
2 j  Rn+1 and I write the Lagrangian function:
Lj = 1
2
+
d
s
X
h
fhsh

V
 
j
  V   j+j  X
h
fh
X
i
tjix

qji ;M
h

  C  GjX
h
fh
!
(13)
First, notice that the optimal tax rate 12 does not change even in the presence
of public expenditure which nances public goods. Instead
Proposition 9 the marginal rate of transformation is equal to the sum of idio-
syncratic preferences for the public good of groups weighted by their size and
density.
Proof. The rst order conditions for 13 are:
@Lj
@qj1
=
d
s
X
h
@V h
@qj1
fhsh + j
 X
o
tjo
X
h
fh
@xho
@qj1
+ xho
!
= 0
...
@Lj
@qjn
=
d
s
X
h
@V h
@qjn
fhsh + j
 X
o
tjo
X
h
fh
@xho
@qjn
+ xho
!
= 0 (14)
@Lj
@Gj
=
d
s
X
h
@V h
@Gj
fhsh   j
 
MRT j
X
h
fh
!
= 0 (15)
Since in equation 15 @V
h
@Gj =
'h
Gj we obtain a nal version of the equation which
refers to the choice of public good:
d
P
h
'hfhsh
sGj
X
h
fh
= j
 
MRT j

(16)
28
To provide an example, suppose now that C
 
Gj

=
 
Gj
2
, with MRT j =
2Gj . Equation 16 becomes
d
P
h
'hfhsh
sGj
X
h
fh
= 2jGj (17)
which, solved with respect to Gj yields:
Gj =
0BB@d
P
h
'hfhsh
2sj
X
h
fh
1CCA
1
2
(18)
This expression clearly shows how the provision of public good depends on the
mindedness of groups, that is on the idiosyncratic parameter 'h.
In this expression j represents the marginal cost of public funds, dened
as the social cost of spending one extra dollar on any given public good and it
measures the distortionary e¤ect of taxation.
Proposition 10 The provision of public good is strictly increasing in the single-
mindedness of the group, weighted by its density and size and decreasing in the
marginal cost of public fund.
Proof. Performing some comparative statics we see that
@Gj
@'h
=
1
2
0BB@d
P
h
'hfhsh
2sj
X
h
fh
1CCA
  12
dfhsh
2sj
X
h
fh
> 0
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@Gj
@sh
=
1
2
0BB@d
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h
'hfhsh
2sj
X
h
fh
1CCA
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dfh'h
2sj
X
h
fh
> 0
@Gj
@fh
=
1
2
0BB@d
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'hfhsh
2sj
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fh
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'hsh
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@Gj
@j
=  1
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'hfhsh
2sj
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h
fh
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  12
dfhsh
2s (j)
2
X
h
fh
< 0
Otherwise, the Ramsey rule does not change with respect to the previous
case and the reason is simple. If the Ramsey rule detects the most e¢ cient way
to nance a certain level of expenditure, for every level of expenditure, all the
more so it must detect the most e¢ cient way to nance the level of expenditure
when this is chosen in an optimal way to nance G. Of course, tax rates di¤er
depending on the level of G, since higher level of G entails higher level of tax
revenues, but the optimal tax rate structure does not change with respect to
the previous case.
Therefore, the provision of public good is higher the higher the presence
of more single-minded groups which ask for it. With respect to the classic
Samuelson rule, a model with single-minded groups states that the provision
of public goods is not only ine¢ cient because of the presence of distortionary
taxation, but also because of the political failure which society falls into, due to
the presence of powerful interest groups which candidates must satisfy.
30
4 Conclusions
In this paper I analysed how voter-seeking candidates decide their indirect tax-
ation policies in a Probabilistic Voting model. Results say that candidates are
captured by the most powerful (single-minded) groups, which not necessarily
coincide with the median voter, but may represent even the richest components
of society. These results are at odds with the classic results achieved exploiting
the median voter theorem, because it is no longer the median position on the
income scale which determines the equilibrium policies chosen by candidates,
but the ability of groups to focus on their more preferred issues, instead.
Finally, this model provides a possible explanation to the existence of indi-
rect taxation, since we perfectly know how the optimal direct-cum-indirect tax
problem puts all commodity taxes to zero and raises everything through income
tax (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976). Instead, this model may suggest how there
could be an interest by powerful single-minded groups to prevent a substantial
shift from indirect to direct taxation. Since the indirect taxation is mostly re-
gressive whilst direct taxation mostly progressive, richest single-minded groups
would not favour this shift. The direct-cum-indirect tax problem can be per-
fectly studied using Probabilistic Voting and Single-mindedness theory; I hope
this could be done in future works.
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